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AN EXTENSION  OF NETWORK  EXCHANGE  THEORY* 
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We  extend  network  exchange  theory  (Markovsky,  Willer,  and Patton  1988) to accommo- 
date a new class of power  phenomena.  Previous  theory  and research  have shown  that 
structural  configurations  in some networks  promote  or inhibit  exchange  opportunities, 
leading  to robust  power  and resource  differentials.  The  extension  identifies  a structural 
basis  for subtler  forms of differentiation.  Using computer  simulations  and laboratory 
experiments,  we show that the degree  to which  this "weak  power" is manifested  in re- 
source  accumulations  is conditioned  by local and global network  patterns,  and by the 
experience  and strategies  of actors in the network.  Experimental  tests corroborate  the 
predicted  weak  power effects  and the consequences  of variations  in actors'  negotiating 
experiences. 
NTetwork exchange  theory  (NET)  was de- 
veloped to predict  negotiated  distribu- 
tions  of resources  in a class of networks  con- 
sisting  of interrelated  individual  or corporate 
actors  (Markovsky,  Willer,  and  Patton  1988). 
These networks  provide  a fertile  context  for 
addressing  issues  of power  and  exchange,  so- 
cial dynamics,  structural  transformation,  mi- 
cro-macro  connections,  and other  questions 
central  to sociology.  A recent  issue  of the  jour- 
nal  Social Networks  (Vol.  14  (3-4), Sept.-Dec. 
1992)  is devoted  to locating  power  in  exchange 
networks.  We report  on a newly discovered 
phenomenon  in exchange networks,  weak 
power. Informally,  we define  weak  power  as a 
condition  that  promotes  significant  advantages 
for some network  positions,  but severely  re- 
stricts  those  advantages  relative  to their  poten- 
tial  maxima.  We  also  offer  a formal  definition 
that  distinguishes  weak  power  networks  from 
other  network  types. 
The extension  of NET  to weak  power  phe- 
nomena results from theory competition. 
Yamagishi  and Cook (1990) observed that 
early  versions  of NET  did not predict  certain 
power  differentials  produced  by  their  computer 
simulations.  We  show  that  those  power  differ- 
entials arise from structural  properties  that 
were  not  addressed  in any  previous  theory.  We 
develop  and empirically  test an extension  of 
NET that  identifies  the general  class of net- 
works  and  the  specific  relations  in which  weak 
power  emerges,  and  the  direction  and  strength 
of the  weak  power  effect. 
THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
In NET,  a relation  is an exchange  opportunity 
between  a pair  of individual  or  corporate  deci- 
sion-making  actors,  and an actor's  position 
contains  the  actor  and  is designated  by its pat- 
tern  of relations  to other  actors.  A network  is a 
set of positions  and  relations  that  forms  a uni- 
tary  structure. 
Although  it functions  as a self-contained 
theory,  NET  developed  within  a much  broader 
theoretical  research  program.  This program, 
"elementary  theory,"  addresses  basic social 
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forms including  coercive, conflictual, and ex- 
change relations (Willer and Anderson 1981; 
Willer 1987; Willer  and Markovsky  forthcom- 
ing).' Within  the exchange relations  branch  of 
the elementary  theory are subbranches  for ex- 
clusionary,  inclusionary,  and mixed exchange 
networks.  These designations  indicate  types of 
restrictions on actors' efforts to obtain re- 
sources  in exchange  networks.  In an exclusion- 
ary network,  actors  with two or more relations 
cannot exchange in one or more of their rela- 
tions. In an inclusionary  network,  actors must 
exchange  in more than  one relation.  In a mixed 
network,  actors  can exchange only in some re- 
lations and must exchange in more than one 
relation.2  We focus here on the exclusionary 
exchange  networks branch of  the broader 
theory. 
NET's seven scope conditions delimit the 
situations  to which the theory  may be applied: 
(1) all actors  use identical  strategies  in negotiating 
exchanges; (2) actors  consistently  excluded from 
exchanges  raise  their  offers;  (3) those consistently 
included in exchanges lower their offers; (4) ac- 
tors accept  the best offer they receive, and  choose 
randomly  in deciding among tied best offers; (5) 
each position is related to, and seeks exchange 
with, one or more other positions; (6) at the start 
of an exchange round,  equal pools of positively 
valued resource  units are available  in every rela- 
tion;  (7) two positions  receive  resources  from  their 
common  pool  if  and only  if  they exchange. 
(Markovsky  et al. 1988, p. 223)3 
Stem Network  Kite  Network 
C1  C2  E1  E2 
A  D 
B  E3 
Figure 1. The Stem and Kite Networks 
Stem Network  Kite  Network 
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Figure  2. Initial  GPI  Values  for Stem and Kite Networks 
The Graph-Theoretic  Power Index 
When the scope conditions are satisfied, NET 
predicts relative  power  (higher,  lower,  or 
equal) for each position in a network  relation. 
Power is defined as a "structurally  determined 
potential  for obtaining  relatively favorable  re- 
source  levels" (Markovsky  et al. 1988, p. 224). 
Power is  measured by the graph-theoretic 
power index (GPI). Figure 1 presents two il- 
lustrative  networks,  the "stem"  and the "kite." 
Calculations  are simpler in networks  contain- 
ing two or more  structurally  identical  positions. 
I  Similarly, the self-contained "vulnerability" 
models of  power in networks (Cook, Emerson, 
Gillmore, and Yamagishi 1983; Cook, Gillmore, 
and Yamagishi 1986) developed within the more 
general  program  of power-dependence  theory (e.g., 
Emerson  1981). Markovsky  et al. (1988) contrasted 
vulnerability  models and the graph-theoretic  model 
of network  exchange theory. 
2 To formalize the typology of relation  types, let 
N be the number  of an actor's direct relations  with 
others, M is the maximum number of exchanges 
that can benefit the actor, and Q is the minimum 
number  of exchanges that the actor must complete 
to realize any benefit. The actor's relations  are ex- 
clusionary  when N > M 2 Q = 1, inclusionary  when 
N = M = Q, and mixed when N>  M> Q> I. For 
mixed relations,  when N = M > Q = 1, the relation 
is null; the relation  is inclusion-null  mixed when N 
= M > Q > 1 (Willer and Markovsky  forthcoming). 
Tests for the two mixed types are in progress. 
3 The scope conditions do not define exchange. 
An exchange  is a mutually  agreed-upon  distribution 
of valued resources between actors. This could be 
an agreement  to divide resources from a common 
pool, or the transfer  of ownership of different ob- 
jects, e.g., A gives B $10 for two of B's baseball 
cards. The scope conditions also do not minimize 
the importance of individual agency in networks 
(Markovsky 1987, 1992; Barron  and Smith-Lovin 
1991). The scope conditions  delimit the class of ac- 
tors for which the structurally-derived  predictions 
of the theory are claimed to be accurate. A wide 
range of specifications for individual-level strate- 
gies  and behaviors remains open to exploration. 
Our present focus on structural  effects makes no 
statement  about  the relative "power"  of actors ver- 
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Table 1.  Path Lengths, by Position, for the Stem Network and the Kite Network 
Stem Network  Kite Network 
Position  Position  Position  Position  Position 
PathLength  A  B  C  D  E 
1  3  1  2  4  2 
2  1  1  1  2  1 
3  0  1  1  0  1 
4  0  0  0  0  1 
Graph-Theoretic  Power Index (GPI)  2  1  2  2 
In such  networks  a nonsubscripted  label  indi- 
cates structurally  identical  positions,  e.g., C 
stands  for  Cl and  C2. 
The  first  step  in calculating  GPIs  is to count 
the number  of nonintersecting  paths of every 
length  stemming  from each position.  These 
counts  for the stem  network  and  the kite net- 
work  are  shown  in Table  1. For  example,  El in 
the  kite  network  has  two  paths  of length  1,  El- 
D and El-E2; one nonintersecting  path of 
length 2, e.g., El-E2-D (any other path of 
length  2 must  intersect  this  one  at E2  or  D and 
so is not counted);  one path  of length  3, e.g., 
E1-E2-D-E3;  and  one path  of length  4, e.g., 
E1-E2-D-E3-E4.  There  are  no nonintersecting 
paths with lengths greater  than four. This 
analysis  holds  for  each  E in the  kite  network. 
The  theory  specifies  that  position  i has  struc- 
tural  power  over  position  j when  i can,  without 
cost,  exclude] from  exchanging.  This  induces 
j to accept  lower  payoffs.  By this reasoning, 
odd-length  paths  benefit  their  position  of ori- 
gin by enhancing its capacity to exclude 
(Markovsky  et al. 1988).  Even-length  paths  are 
detrimental  because  they increase  the chance 
of being  excluded.  Thus,  to calculate  GPI,  add 
the  number  of a position's  odd-length  paths  and 
subtract  the number  of even-length  paths. 
These  initial  GPI  values  for each position  in 
each  network  appear  at the bottom  of Table  1 
and  in Figure  2. 
Axioms 
Four  axioms  determine  the relative  power  of 
network  positions.  In Axiom 1, GPI  is calcu- 
lated  using  a more  general  equation  for net- 
works  in which actors  can make e 2  1 ex- 
changes,  each with a different  actor.  In such 
networks, subnetworks  or  domains may 
emerge. Positions residing in more than one 
domain  have a GPI for each domain.4  Let midk 
represent  the number  of nonintersecting  paths 
of length  k in domain  d that  originate  from po- 
sition i, and h is the longest such path.  At i, an 
actor's  power in domain  d is 
Axiom  1: pud,(ed)=f  !J(_1)(k-1)  Midk. 
(ed  )k=1 
Axiom 1 defines GPI2.  The remaining  axioms 
use GPI2  to infer when actors  will and will not 
seek to exchange with each other  and to antici- 
pate their  relative  exchange outcomes: 
Axiom 2:  i seeks exchange with  j if and 
only if pi > pj or if (pi - pj) 2  (Pi 
-Pk)  for all k related  to i. 
Axiom 3:  i and  j can exchange only if each 
seeks exchange with the other. 
Axiom 4: if i and  j exchange, then i receives 
more resources  than  j if and only 
if Pi > Pj 
4 To calculate domain memberships,  let i and  X 
indicate two related positions, and an el  position 
has more than e  relations. Given the set V of all 
positions on a path between i and  j,  i and  j  are in 
the same domain if and only if there exists a path 
such that either V = (0),  or all positions in V are 
e+  positions. Markovsky  et al. (1988) investigated 
a network  in which each of three positions had two 
GPI values, one indicating  equal power in one do- 
main and another  indicating  low power in a second 
domain. Results strongly supported predictions. 
Because  we  are dealing  here with networks in 
which e =  1, the terms  "network"  and "domain"  are 
coterminous,  and we use "network"  throughout.  In 
general,  however,  our assertions  about  networks  are 
more accurately viewed  as assertions about do- 
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In previous experiments, hypotheses derived 
from  these axioms accurately  predicted  relative 
exchange profits for different positions, net- 
work decompositions  at certain  relations,  and 
power  reversals  induced  by  changes  in e 
(Markovsky  et al. 1988). The research  also re- 
futed alternative  hypotheses from power-de- 
pendence  theory  (Cook et al. 1983; Cook et al. 
1986). 
NEW THEORETICAL  CONCERNS 
Other researchers  have questioned the ability 
of the GPI to predict  power levels in stem and 
kite networks.  Yamagishi  and  Cook (1990), us- 
ing a computer  simulation,  claimed that posi- 
tions A and D have high power, in contrast  to 
GPI predictions  of equal power in all stem and 
kite relations  after  Axiom 2 is applied.5  How- 
ever,  their  simulation's  profit  differentials  were 
very small (equality ? 2) relative to empirical 
studies and other simulations they described 
(Cook et al. 1983). Furthermore,  they did not 
publish  the simulation  algorithm,  show how to 
derive their  predictions,  or present  any empiri- 
cal evidence. Stolte (1990) provided a formal 
model, but noted  that  it "does not perform  well 
in predicting  positional power, as conditioned 
by remote structural influences"  (p.  141). 
Hence, although both studies recognized that 
power differences  can exist in these structures, 
they did not offer a testable  theory  for predict- 
ing specific power differences or identifying 
the class of structures  in which these  power  dif- 
ferences should occur. 
Markovsky,  Willer,  and  Patton  (1990) agreed 
that  GPI  predicted  no power  differences  among 
actors in the kite  and stem  networks, but 
pointed  out  that although  Yamagishi  and 
Cook's intuitions  could be correct,  the lack of 
an alternative  model and empirical evidence 
weakened  their  argument.  We have since repli- 
cated Yamagishi and Cook's simulations for 
the kite and stem networks  and explored  many 
other  networks.  Our  goal was to provide  an ex- 
plicit, general  method  for predicting  the emer- 
gence of this weak power effect coupled with 
empirical  evidence.6 
During  our  research  we made  several  discov- 
eries. (1) Weak power differentials  are sensi- 
tive to the particular  strategies  adopted  and be- 
haviors  enacted  by actors  in particular  network 
positions. (2) Weak power differentials have 
the same microfoundation  as strong  power dif- 
ferentials:  Actors seeking to avoid exclusion 
from exchanges accept deals favorable  to oth- 
ers and unfavorable  to themselves. (3) Weak 
power is produced  by a subtle interaction  be- 
tween network  structures  and exchange condi- 
tions. (4) Although  the networks  in which weak 
power emerges had already been identified 
(Markovsky et al.  1988), a refinement was 
needed to locate the specific weak power rela- 
tions within  those networks. 
GPI3:  AN ITERATIVE  REFINEMENT 
Our extension of  network exchange theory 
builds on GPI2  to generate  refined predictions 
of  weak power. Under GPI2, ongoing  ex- 
changes  can produce  temporary  changes in the 
number  of an actor's available  exchange part- 
ners, the number  of the partners'  partners,  and 
so on (Markovsky  et al. 1988, p. 225n). Thus, 
the extension, GPI3, must take into account 
temporary  power shifts that arise as some ac- 
tors exchange in a given time period and leave 
behind  altered  substructures.  The stem and kite 
networks  illustrate  these problems,  but our so- 
lution  generalizes  to all weak power networks. 
5 Stolte (1990) asserted  that A has an advantage 
and presented  experimental  evidence for this claim. 
However, his experiment  violates our scope condi- 
tions because subjects' exchange outcomes had no 
bearing  on their  actual  payments  (Stolte 1988). The 
relevance of his results to NET therefore  remains 
undetermined. 
6  We employed a user-friendly  simulation pro- 
gram  for exchange networks,  X-Net, which is avail- 
able on request  from the first  author.  The researcher 
can create or select any network  configuration  and 
choose the number  of "experiments"  and negotia- 
tion "rounds,"  resource pool sizes, exchanges per 
round, and actors' decision strategies. Unless oth- 
erwise specified, an actor  decreases all offers in the 
next round by one unit if the actor makes all the 
exchanges it seeks in a given round. If the actor 
makes fewer deals than were sought, then the actor 
(I)  decreases its offers by one unit to those with 
whom a deal was completed, and (2) increases of- 
fers by one unit to those with whom a deal was not 
completed. In a given round,  an actor can seek ex- 
change only from a number  of others equal to the 
maximum  number  of exchanges it can complete in 
the round. In the current version of  X-Net, three 
partner-choice strategies are available: (1)  actor 
randomly  seeks exchange with any partner  whose 
offer is "complementary," e.g.,  actor offers  14, WEAK  POWER  201 
The  new  procedure analyzes  exchange- 
seeks. In the original formulation,  an actor i 
was said to be seeking exchange when his, her, 
or its offers to another,  j, are competitive with 
j's alternative  offers.7  Exchange-seek  analysis 
is a tool that  generates  predictions  of a network 
structure's  effect  on  exchange  outcomes. 
Whether  applied  to human,  corporate,  or simu- 
lated  networks,  the theory's  exchange-seek  axi- 
oms need not correspond to actual events. 
However, the axioms are not arbitrary  -  they 
were designed to generate  derivations  and hy- 
potheses for exchange outcomes that are more 
precise and accurate  than alternatives.  As with 
any formal  theory,  its derived  hypotheses  must 
be empirically informative  -  not necessarily 
its axioms (Jasso 1988). In the case of NET, 
derived hypotheses predict (1) when actors in 
empirical tests will not seek exchange and, 
thus, where the network breaks from disuse, 
and (2) the relative exchange outcomes at dif- 
ferent  positions. 
Figure 3, Step 1 applies  Axiom 2 to the stem 
and kite networks.  For example, "CIA A" in- 
dicates "Cl seeks exchange with  A." Step 2 ap- 
plies Axiom 3 and shows reciprocal  exchange- 
seeks.  GPI2 is  then  recalculated  for  the 
subnetworks  (Step 3). Because all GPI2  values 
are equal, all original relations are restored. 
When an isolate emerges, e.g., D in Step 2, it 
receives a value of  1.8 Applying Axiom 2 to 
the recalculated  GPI2  values indicates that all 
actors seek exchange in all relations  and there 
should be no permanent breaks in the net- 
works. Also,  according to GPI2  values, there 
are no structurally-based  power advantages, 
i.e., no positions can consistently  exclude oth- 
C1  *  C2  E1l  -  E2 
A  Step  I  D 
B  E3  *  -  .  E4 
C1  <  -  C2  E1  *-  <  E2 
A  Step2  D 
B  E3  *-  E4 
1  1  1  1 
i  Step3  1 
1  1  1 
Figure  3. Iterative  Analysis  for Computation  of GPI2  for 
Stem  and  Kite  Networks 
ersfrom exchanging  without  themselves  suffer- 
ing losses. Thus there will be no bidding wars 
driving  offers toward  extremes. 
Even when positions in a network  have the 
same GPI2,  as in the stem and kite networks, 
they may still be differentiated  by a structural 
property weaker than that producing strong 
power.  The reasoning  is this:  An actor in a po- 
sition with two or more equal power relations 
initially has no preference  among the alterna- 
tives. As negotiations  proceed,  however,  one or 
more of the alternatives  may have already  ex- 
changed and thus become unavailable.  In the 
stem network,  for  example,  if A and  B exchange 
first in a given round,  the C's are not excluded 
and can exchange with each other.  If A and Cl 
other offers  its complement,  10; (2) actors ran- 
domly seek exchange after  compromising  with oth- 
ers using a "split-the-difference"  rule; (3) actors 
seek exchange from those making the most profit- 
able offers after compromising. The modular  pro- 
gram design also facilitates exploration of other 
strategies via programming  changes. 
7 For example, if i offers 5 units to j, and  j's best 
alternative  offer is 10, then i's offer is not competi- 
tive with the alternative.  From  the standpoint  of our 
analytic method,  i is not seeking exchange with  j in 
this case. This definition of exchange-seeking (and 
nonseeking) enables us to predict which network 
relations will be used. The definition embodies no 
implicit assumptions about actors' motives, inter- 
pretations,  strategies,  etc. 
8 The procedure  yields identical  predictions  if the 
isolate is assigned a GPI2  of 0, but doing so results 
in additional  steps. We have not yet fully explored 
the implications  of assigning I versus 0 to isolates. 
More  than  one iteration  of the exchange-seek analy- 
sis may be required  in more complex networks. In 
complex networks, the analysis is complete when 
index values remain  unchanged. 202  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
B  1  ABC1 C2  1/3 
1/3  1/  l1/1  O  A  CC2  1/12 
S  ~ ~  ~  ~~*  C1  1/-*  AB,  C1  C2  11 
1/3~  ~ 
/2  C 
A -4  C1  >  A  ?--  -->  1/12  /3 
A  112  1/ 
A 
1/1 
>AC1  1/6 
1/31/ 
\  C2  -/  AB, C1  C2  1/12 
1/2  C1 
C2  -  1/12 
A  AC2  1/6 
Figure  4. Tree  Diagram  for  Computing  GPI3  for  the  Stem  Network 
exchange  first,  however,  B and  C2  are  excluded 
for that  round.  Unlike  the situation  in strong 
power  structures,  the  consequences  of such  ex- 
clusions  are  not  severe  because  it is relatively 
inexpensive  for  an  excluded  position  to be in- 
cluded  subsequently.  If A and  C1  exchange,  in 
the next  round  B and  C2  can  attract  A by rais- 
ing their  offers  only slightly  above  Cj's. If A 
then exchanges  with B, C1 and C2 may ex- 
change  with  each  other.  If,  instead,  A exchanges 
with  C2, B will have  been  excluded  twice  and 
can  offer  slightly  more  -  an  amount  that  should 
then  be Xs best  offer.  Under  the  scope  condi- 
tions  of the  theory,  B should  not  be  consistently 
excluded  and  thus  should  not  have  to  offer  more 
than  occasional  small  concessions  to continue 
exchanging  with  A. Thus,  the  stem  and  the  kite 
networks are examples of weak power struc- 
tures. 
Strong  and Weak  Structural  Forces 
Despite  their  common  basis  in  exclusion,  strong 
power  and  weak  power  have  important  differ- 
ences.  (1) In  strong  power  structures,  exchange 
outcomes  approach  maximum  differentiation 
across  positions,  constrained  only  by  the  size  of 
the resource  pools;  in weak  power  structures, 
differentiation  is independent  of pool size. (2) 
Only  strong  power  structures  exhibit  a 
"ratcheting"  process whereby actors in struc- 
turally  disadvantaged  positions serially outbid 
one another  through  ever-increasing  offers to 
the advantaged.  (3) As a result  of such bidding 
wars among the structurally disadvantaged, 
even passive bargaining  stances result in ex- 
treme profit advantages  for actors in structur- 
ally advantaged  positions in strong  power net- 
works. In weak power networks, obtaining 
more than minimal profit advantages  requires 
more active strategizing by the structurally 
advantaged.  (4) Consequently,  in weak power 
networks  structural  forces keep  exchanges  rela- 
tively  close  to equal profit divisions.  Con- 
versely, in strong power networks structural 
forces move outcomes toward maximum dif- 
ferentiation. (5) A fundamental  difference is 
that  strong  power  structures  guarantee  that  one 
or more actors  will be excluded by another  ac- 
tor who is never excluded. Weak  power struc- 
tures ensure that either all positions are prone 
to exclusion (as in the kite), or that no position 
-  not even a position that  of structural  neces- 
sity is never  excluded (e.g., A in the stem)  -  is 
assured  of being able to exclude another  with- 
out cost. Thus, the certainty  of exclusions in 
strong  power networks  is replaced  by the  possi- 
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To make  more  refined  predictions,  we must 
turn  this  "possibility"  of exclusion  into  a prob- 
ability  measure  that  applies  when  structurally 
dissimilar  network  positions  have the same 
GPI2  values. To perform  the weak power 
analysis,  we calculate  each position's  likeli- 
hood  of inclusion  under  a "random  exchange- 
seek"  assumption.  The resulting  probability 
measure  is GPI3.  The  easiest  way  to grasp  this 
measure  is with  the tree  diagram  for the stem 
network  shown  in Figure  4. Branches  corre- 
spond  to events  (e.g.,  exchange-seeks)  that  are 
assigned  probabilities.  A series  of connected 
branches  represents  a combination  of events 
whose  overall  probability  is the  product  of the 
values  assigned  to its  constituent  branches.  The 
probability  of a particular  outcome,  e.g., a mu- 
tual  A-C1  exchange-seek,  is the sum  of all of 
the probabilities  associated  with  branch  com- 
binations  leading  to that  outcome.  The GPI3 
value  for a position,  then,  is the sum of the 
probabilities  across  its relations.9 
In Figure  4, arbitrarily  beginning  with A 
does not affect  calculations  because  the tree 
accounts  for all exchange-seek  combinations. 
Dashed  lines are combinations  of exchange- 
seeks  that  lead  to no mutual  selections.  These 
occur  1/12  + 1/12  = 1/6 of the time.  For  each 
of these  branches,  the entire  tree  begins  again 
at  each  of the  two  dashed  lines.  Thus,  the  long- 
run  probability  of no mutual  exchange-seeks  is 
an infinite  series  whose  members  approach  0 
and  whose  sum  over  the  two  relevant  branches 
approaches  1/6.  The  probability  values  for  the 
other  branches  are  then  adjusted  by a factor  of 
1/(1 -  1/6) = 1.2 in this case. The probabilities 
for each relation  are: 
p{AB} = 1.2 x (3+  I2  +  1)=  .6,  p{A}=12x(  12  12 
p{AC1} = p{AC2} = 1.2 x  = .2, 
P{CIC2}  =1.  2X(3x  + 1I+  1  =.6. 
The  probabilities  of mutual  exchange-seeks  for 
each position are: 
p{A} -  p{AB} + p{ACI  + p{AC2}  = 1.  0, 
p{B} =p{AB} =.6, 
p{C} =. 2+.6 =.8. 
Applying  the  same  analytic  method  to the kite 
network,  we obtain: 
p{DEi} = .2051, 
p{EIE2} = p{E3E4} = .5898, 
4 
p{D} =  ,p{DE1 } = .8205, 
i=1 
p{Ei} = p{EEj  }+p{DEi}  = .7949. 
If mutual  exchange-seeks  promote  exchanges, 
then  these  probability  values  differentiate  po- 
sitions  according  to a structurally-based  likeli- 
hood of inclusion  in exchange.  These prob- 
abilities  can then  be used  to generate  hypoth- 
eses for  exchange  outcomes. 
Individual  Forces 
Although  our  goal  is to improve  GPI2's  ability 
to predict  exchange  outcomes  based  on net- 
work  structures,  under  certain  conditions  actors 
can systematically  alter  structurally-induced 
exchange  outcomes.  Our  approach  is to (1) 
treat structural-level  factors as  setting a 
baseline  for exchange  outcomes  as detailed 
above,  (2) consider  how individual-level  be- 
haviors  can modify  outcomes  relative  to that 
baseline,  and  (3) conduct  tests  that  manipulate 
a particular  individual-level  condition  expected 
to affect  such  behaviors. 
The  two  most  important  decisions  that  actors 
in our networks  make  are (1) with whom  to 
exchange  and  (2) whether  and  how to adjust 
offers  contingent  on prior  or anticipated  out- 
comes.  In our computer  simulations  of weak 
power  structures,  unconditional  (i.e., random) 
offer-adjustment  strategies  consistently  pro- 
9 This probability  analysis extracts information 
on a particular  structural  property  -  it does not 
predict actual behaviors. We have two different 
computer  programs  that calculate these probabili- 
ties, both available from the authors on request: 
WPOWER  calculates exact probabilities,  WEAK- 
NET estimates probabilities by simulating thou- 
sands  of rounds  of random  exchange-seeks  and  ex- 
changes. WEAKNET  estimates converge on 
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duce small but systematic outcome differen- 
tials. For example, when simulated actors in 
the stem network  adjust  their offers randomly 
by -1,  0, or +1 following exchange or exclu- 
sion, A still has a consistent  advantage  over B 
of one or two points above equal profit levels. 
With conditional adjustment  strategies (e.g., 
"add  one to last offer following exclusion;  sub- 
tract one following inclusion"), varying part- 
ner-choice strategies result in varying advan- 
tages for A. Some strategies  give A larger  ad- 
vantages,  but never as great as those in strong 
power structures.  In general, most strategies 
either sustain minimal weak power differen- 
tials or enhance  them to levels still well below 
those for strong  power. Furthermore,  although 
certain combinations of strategies affect out- 
comes in strong power structures  (Markovsky 
1987), strong  power  is clearly  more  robust  than 
weak power. 
These simulations have direct implications 
for empirical research. In network exchange 
experiments, subjects are instructed  to try to 
maximize profit. Few hesitate to do so. How- 
ever, when subjects  must  conduct  simultaneous 
negotiations  in multiple relations, optimal 
strategies may not be obvious. In such cases, 
subjects' strategies  should improve  with expe- 
rience. The research  reported  below examines 
whether experienced subjects discover more 
potent  strategies.  Further,  based  on the simula- 
tion results,  those more  potent  strategies  should 
favor subjects in advantaged positions over 
subjects in disadvantaged positions, and so 
amplify the weak power effect.'0 
METHOD  AND HYPOTHESES 
Subjects  were undergraduates  at a large  univer- 
sity who agreed to participate  in the research 
in return  for pay. After arriving  at the labora- 
tory,  each subject  received  general  information 
about the research.  Instructions  noted that the 
experiment investigates the effect of  social 
structures  on negotiation. Subjects were told 
the size of the resource  pools to be divided (24 
units) as well as the monetary value of each 
point (5 cents). 
Subjects interacted via interconnected mi- 
crocomputers  located in separate  rooms. The 
exchange  network  configuration  was displayed 
on subjects' screens, along with full informa- 
tion  on  current offers  and completed  ex- 
changes. Prior to the experiment, assistants 
showed subjects how to interpret  information 
on their computer  screens and how to use the 
keyboard  to make  and  accept  offers. This train- 
ing period ended with a practice session  in 
which subjects "negotiated" with simulated 
others.  The practice  session was realistic  in that 
subjects made and received  offers  as they 
would in the experiment;  but practice  was un- 
realistic with respect to the others' offers and 
their likelihoods of accepting  the subjects' of- 
fers. The practice network also differed from 
the networks  actually  tested in the study. 
Experiments  were organized  by rounds,  pe- 
riods  and  sessions. Each session involved a dif- 
ferent  set of subjects  -  eight sets of four sub- 
jects each for the stem network  and six sets of 
five subjects each for the kite network. Sub- 
jects were rotated to new positions between 
periods  by a software  reconfiguration,  and  each 
subject eventually occupied every position. 
This allowed us to distinguish  network  effects 
from idiosyncratic  subject-pair  effects."  I  Each 
period  contained  four negotiation  rounds  of up 
to five minutes  each. At the end of each round, 
subjects  were informed  of their  earnings  in that 
10 Technically speaking, our computer simula- 
tions  embody  auxiliary  assumptions  (vis-h-vis 
NET's axioms) regarding actors' decision strate- 
gies, and  the outcomes of those simulations  provide 
derivations that predict long-run exchange out- 
comes and frequencies. Translating  those deriva- 
tions into operational  terms yields the individual- 
level hypotheses  that we test empirically. 
I I One reviewer  suggested that  owing to the rela- 
tively small number of rounds per period, the ef- 
fects of exclusion may be attributable  to subjects' 
perceptions  of its likelihood rather  than to its inci- 
dence. This could be the case, but GPI3  predicts  ex- 
change outcome ranks, not empirical exclusion 
rates. GPI3 correctly predicts exclusion  rates in 
WEAKNET simulations and so, with refinements, 
could serve as the basis for a model of actual rates. 
Moreover,  actual inclusion rates were in fact clos- 
est to GPI3  values for inexperienced  subjects who, 
presumably,  would be more likely than  experienced 
subjects to learn by being excluded. Although ro- 
tating  subjects  between  periods  may have prevented 
them from developing regular  patterns  of exchange 
with their partners,  as they would in natural set- 
tings, our purpose was to test the weak power for- 
mulation, not to reproduce  any particular  "natural 
setting" in the laboratory. Webster and Kervin 
(1971) provided a cogent rationale for the use of 
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round.  At the  end  of the session  subjects  were 
paid  based  on the  points  they  earned.  The  aver- 
age was  $10. 
All subjects  received  the same  training,  but 
subjects  differed  in their  previous  experience 
with network  exchange  experiments.  For the 
stem  network,  four  groups  contained  subjects 
who had  prior  experience  in experiments  on 
another  network  structure,  while  the  other  four 
groups  were  composed  of inexperienced  sub- 
jects. For  the kite network,  four  groups  were 
experienced  and  two  were  inexperienced. 
Structural  Effects 
The probability  analyses  permit  us to state 
critical  hypotheses  for exchange  outcomes  in 
experimental  stem  and  kite  networks.  Hypoth- 
eses pertain  to mean  resource  units  obtained 
per  exchange,  and  are  derived  by  relating  theo- 
retical  inclusion  probability  ranks  to exchange 
outcome  ranks. 
HI: In  the  stem  network,  the  order  of ex- 
change  outcomes  by position  is 
HIa:  A > B when  A and  B exchange; 
HIb:  A > C  when A and C exchange; 
HI,: (A - B) when A and B exchange > 
(A -  C) when A and C exchange. 
H2:  For  the  kite  network,  the  predicted  order  is 
D > E when  D and  E exchange. 
Individual  Effects 
Strategic  behavior  tends to enhance weak 
power  differentials,  as observed  in computer 
simulations.  Assuming  that  experienced  sub- 
jects  use  more  effective  strategies  than  inexpe- 
rienced  subjects: 
H3:  Resource  differentials  predicted  in HI  and 
H2  will  be  greater  for  experienced  subjects 
than  for  inexperienced  subjects. 
Strong  Power vs. Weak  Power 
The  extension  of the  theory  to allow  for  struc- 
tural  effects  coupled  with  the computer  simu- 
lations  for  individual  effects  permit  the  follow- 
ing  prediction: 
H4: Resource differentials will be greater in 
strong power  networks  than in  weak 
power networks. 
RESULTS 
Analytic  Method 
A dummy variable, constrained regression 
analysis  was used to estimate  positional  effects 
(Winer 1962; Skvoretz and Willer 1991). The 
units  of analysis  are  the  observed  exchanges  and 
non-exchanges  among  pairs  of subjects.  During 
a session,  a series  of M exchanges  occurs  among 
different  subjects  in different  relations.  We in- 
dex the  elements  of this series  as m E I 1, 2, ..., 
M). Let i and  j indicate  different  subjects  such 
that  i,j e  {1,2,..  .,  N), where  N is the number 
of subjects  and also the number  of positions in 
the experimental  network.  Variables  in the sta- 
tistical  model are defined  as follows: 
Pi.  is i's outcome ("profit")  from the m-th 
exchange. For an i-j exchange, either i's or  j's 
outcome may serve as the datum  as long as it 
is always the one used. 
R(ij)  refers to the occurrence  of exchange/ 
nonexchange between i and j.  For each ex- 
change in the network,  R(ij)  = I if subjects i 
and  j exchange;  R(i,  j) = 0 otherwise.  There  are 
N(N-1)/2  different  R(ij)'s  in the network. 
Qk is the positional advantage/disadvantage 
in relation k. Two related  positions are either 
structurally  distinct or identical, e.g.,  in the 
stem network,  C1 and C2 occupy structurally 
identical positions; A and B occupy structur- 
ally distinct positions. Any two relations are 
also either structurally  distinct or identical, 
e.g., A-C1 and A-C2 are structurally  identical 
relations;  A-B  and A-C1 are structurally  dis- 
tinct relations.  For relations  involving distinct 
positions, the theory  predicts  which position is 
structurally  advantaged  and  which is disadvan- 
taged. Qk is then an "effect variable."  Let k = 
1, 2, . . . , K enumerate  structurally  distinct re- 
lations  involving structurally  distinct  positions. 
These are A-B  and A-C in the stem network, 
D-E in the kite network.  If the m-th  exchange 
is i-j, where i and  j reside in relation  k, then Qk 
=  1 if i occupies the (theoretically  specified) 
advantaged  position, -1  if i is disadvantaged, 
and 0 otherwise.  The statistical  model for ex- 
change outcomes is 
P = 12 + 2,  aR(i,  j) + X  bkQk + error. 206  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
Table 2.  Position Effects From  Regression of Exchange 
Outcomes on Network Characteristics 
Position Effect 
Inexpe- 
Network  Total  Experienced  rienced 
and Relation  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Stem Network 
A-B relation  2.424***  3.288***  1.401*** 
(.320)  (.461)  (.412) 
A-C relation  3.334***  4.487**  2.749** 
(.880)  (1.488)  (.990) 
R2  .653  .718  .531 
Number  of exchanges  226  116  110 
Kite Network 
D-E relation  1.152***  2.054***  -.075 
(.348)  (.507)  (.325) 
R2  .502  .498  .656 
Number  of exchanges  236  158  78 
**  p < .01  ***  p < .001 (one-tailed test) 
Note: Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  A's 
or D's estimated advantage  in a given relation is 2 x the 
position effect. 
The aij  parameters  are relation effects, i.e., id- 
iosyncratic effects  attributable to particular 
pairs of subjects. The bk  parameters  are posi- 
tion effects, used to test for positional  power in 
structurally  distinct  relations.  By fixing the in- 
tercept  at 12 (one-half the resource  pool), rela- 
tion effects and position effects can be inter- 
preted  as variations  from equality. 
This model has several important  features. 
First,  in exchanges between structurally  identi- 
cal positions, any profit variations  are attribut- 
able to relation effects.  Second, degrees of 
freedom  for testing  position  effects are  reduced 
considerably  over the number  used in a simple 
test of means. Including relation effects ab- 
sorbs degrees of freedom and also reduces  er- 
ror  that  would otherwise  be associated  with the 
positional  power hypotheses.  Third,  more pre- 
cise tests for similarities  or differences  in posi- 
tion effects are possible, e.g., we estimate  con- 
strained  models and assess the improvement  in 
fit over less constrained  models. Such  compari- 
sons between models are possible both within 
and between network  configurations. 
Analyses 
Hypothesis  1. There  were 226 exchanges  in the 
eight stem groups.  Six subject  pairings  x eight 
groups  yield 48 relation  (R) variables.  A-B and 
A-C are the two structurally  distinct relations 
(Q) involving structurally  distinct  positions. In 
both  the  A-B and  A-C relations,  A is predicted 
to be the advantaged  position and is coded as 
such.  Results  are  shown in column 1 of Table  2. 
Hypotheses la and lb are supported.  A ob- 
tained 2.4 points beyond equality in A-B  ex- 
changes  after  controlling  for subject-pair  (rela- 
tion) effects, which implies an estimated  pool 
division of 14.4 -  9.6. For the A-C relation,  A 
obtained  3.3 points above equality for an esti- 
mated  pool division of 15.3 -  8.7. Both advan- 
tages are significantly  different  from 0. How- 
ever, contrary to Hypothesis 1  c, the effects 
were not significantly  different  from  each other 
(F[1,182] = .846, p = .359). That is, the model 
in which both effects are estimated is not a 
significant  improvement  over a model in which 
both variables  are  constrained  to have the same 
effect. 
Hypothesis  2. There were 236 exchanges in 
the six kite groups  and  60 relation  variables  (  10 
subject  pairings  x 6 groups).  The only structur- 
ally distinct  relation  involving structurally  dis- 
tinct positions is the D-E relation.  D is coded 
as the advantaged  position. Column I of Table 
2 shows that, as predicted, occupying the D 
position  in the D-E relation  of the kite network 
conferred a small but statistically significant 
advantage,  approximately  13.2 -  10.8. There- 
fore, D exercises weak power in the kite net- 
work and Hypothesis  2 is supported. 
Hypothesis  3. The regression  analyses were 
repeated controlling for subject experience. 
Results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of 
Table  2. In the stem network,  experienced  and 
inexperienced  subjects exploited weak power 
advantages  to significant degrees. Moreover, 
experienced subjects had an additional out- 
come advantage  of around 1.8 points, as pre- 
dicted by Hypothesis  3. For the A-B relations, 
the difference  was statistically  significant,  i.e., 
the null hypothesis  that  the position effects are 
equal  for  experienced  and  inexperienced 
groups was rejected (F[1,180]  = 9.098, p  = 
.003). The difference  between position effects 
for the A-C relation  in experienced  versus in- 
experienced  groups was not significant, how- 
ever.  In the stem network,  then,  experience  has 
the strongest  and  most consistent  effect in A-B 
relations. 
Results  for the role of experience  in the D-E 
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closely  to predictions. Experienced subjects 
exploited their  positional advantage,  inexperi- 
enced subjects  did not.  The null hypothesis  that 
the position  effects are  equal  for the two groups 
was also rejected  (F[1, 181] = 9.576, p = .002), 
indicating that experience translates  into sig- 
nificant  profit  advantages  in this structure.12 
Only one of the possible profit-enhancing 
strategies  that  structurally-advantaged  actors  in 
simulated weak power networks could adopt 
prevailed  in our  experiments:  Experienced  sub- 
jects in advantaged  positions made higher de- 
mands, and experienced  subjects in disadvan- 
taged positions met these demands. That is, 
relative  to inexperienced  subjects,  experienced 
subjects in advantaged  positions did not have 
to discover their advantages  and learn to ex- 
ploit them, and experienced  subjects  in disad- 
vantaged positions did not have to learn by 
trial-and-error  to avoid exclusion by making 
more favorable offers. For instance, average 
offers to B were 9.52 points for inexperienced 
A's and 6.33 points for experienced  A's. The 
average  offer to A from inexperienced  B's was 
11.74 points, and 14.01 points from experi- 
enced B's. Results  from  an analysis  of variance 
are presented  in Table 3. In the stem network, 
the position x experience interaction  indicates 
that for experienced subjects relative to inex- 
perienced  subjects,  B's offers are  more  extreme 
in the positive direction and A's are more ex- 
treme in the negative direction. For inexperi- 
enced subjects  in the kite network,  D's offered 
E's 9.31 points on average, and E's offered 
Table 3.  Analysis of Variance for Negotiation Offers in 
Stem Networks and Kite Networks 
Sum of 
Variable  Squares  d.f.  F 
Stem Network 
Position (A,B)  1552.433  1  194.766*** 
Experience  13.329  1  1.672 
Position x experience  473.734  1  59.434* 
Error  1992.690  250 
Kite Network 
Position (D,E)  108.325  1  14.890*** 
Experience  110.753  1  15.224*** 
Position x experience  146.437  1  20.129*** 
Error  1716.864  236 
pa  .001 
9.07 points  to D's; for experienced  subjects,  the 
respective  means were 9.09 and 12.17. Results 
of the analysis of variance  in Table 3 indicate 
that the dominant  effect of experience in the 
kite network  was to raise E's offers. This po- 
tent experience-position  combination  also 
seems to produce  the significant main effects, 
given that  the other  three  position x experience 
combinations are relatively close  to one an- 
other.'3 
Hypothesis  4.  To  examine  the  relative 
strength of advantages in strong power net- 
works versus weak power networks,  we com- 
pared our findings with results from typical 
strong power experiments (Markovsky et al. 
1988). The contrast is striking: There is no 
overlap  in the distributions  of mean  advantages 
between strong power groups versus weak 
power groups. The minimum advantage ob- 
served for any strong power group was 6.66 
points, compared  to a maximum  advantage  of 
12 We also estimated  a single-equation  model that 
included  a dummy variable  to capture  the effects of 
experience. This model is more complex because 
the experimental design forces a collinearity be- 
tween the dummy variable for experience and the 
dummy  variables  for the individual  pairs,  and inter- 
pretation of the parameter  estimates depends on 
which level of experience  is chosen as the reference 
category,  i.e., assigned a value of 0. Two specifica- 
tions are possible. In the kite network,  for example, 
when "inexperienced" is the reference category, 
structural position has no significant effect,  but 
there is a significant, positive interaction  between 
experience and structural  position; when "experi- 
enced"  is the reference  category,  structural  position 
has a significant,  positive effect while there  is a sig- 
nificant, negative interaction between experience 
and structural  position. Both specifications support 
our conclusion: Inexperienced  subjects  have no ad- 
vantage; experienced subjects have an advantage; 
and the difference is significant. 
13 Analyses using experienced subjects in the 
stem network  may provide insights into how expe- 
rience affects behavior. One group of experienced 
subjects participated  in the kite network in a prior 
session. The mean exchange outcome for members 
of this group occupying the A position was 13.86 
points. In contrast,  the other  three  groups  of experi- 
enced  subjects  had previously  interacted  in  a 
strong-power  structure  and, for these subjects, the 
mean  outcome for A in the stem network  was 17.00 
points. The difference between the two means was 
statistically  significant.  This suggests that prior  ex- 
perience  affects outcomes via the expectations  they 
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6.60 points in the present  experiment.  The av- 
erage advantage in the strong power experi- 
ments was approximately  14 points versus ap- 
proximately  4 points  in the present  study.  Simi- 
lar contrasts  hold with regard  to other experi- 
ments (Skvoretz  and Willer 1991). In sum, the 
hypothesis that strong power produces larger 
profit differentials than does weak power is 
clearly supported. 
SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSION 
By extending network exchange theory, we 
identified a new structural  basis for positional 
power in networks. Experimental  research  on 
two different  network  structures  tested  hypoth- 
eses derived from the extended theory.  These 
hypotheses predicted  advantages  or disadvan- 
tages for certain  positions in certain  relations, 
the relative  magnitudes  of strong  power effects 
and weak power effects, and  how resource  dif- 
ferentials  were affected  by subjects  having ex- 
perience in other exchange networks.  Overall, 
we  found strong support for the extended 
theory. 
The  extended  theory  answers  questions  raised 
by Yamagishi and Cook (1990)  and Stolte 
(1990). Corresponding  to Simmel's notion of 
"formal sociology" (Simmel [1917] 1950, p. 
21), and  contrary  to the  usual  approach  in sociol- 
ogy, these  questions  were answered  using  simu- 
lations  and  experiments  rather  than  work  in the 
field. Of what  general  empirical  import,  then,  is 
the phenomenon  of weak power? 
The weak power extension to network ex- 
change theory bridges the relatively simple, 
sparsely-connected  networks in which strong 
power effects are typically observed and the 
more  complex  and  densely-connected  networks 
generally  found  in natural  social relations.  Such 
variables  are within  the original  purview  of so- 
cial exchange theory (Homans 1967,  1974; 
Blau 1964).  Formally  constituted  structures  like 
monopolistic  markets and hierarchies  are 
sparsely-connected -  they illustrate strong 
power  differentials.  In contrast,  informal  struc- 
tures like friendship  groups are more densely 
connected  and  any  power  differences  tend  to be 
relatively  small. The theoretical  extension sug- 
gests that the heart  of strong  power lies in the 
absence  of exchange  opportunities  for  the weak 
and the exchange denials thus created.  All else 
being equal,  higher  connectivity  provides  more 
opportunities  for weak positions to "short-cir- 
cuit" the structural  advantages  of the strong, 
and thus a greater  likelihood of small resource 
differentials,  i.e., weak power. 
In addition to permitting the analysis of 
denser, more "realistic"  networks, our weak 
power analysis has yielded other dividends. 
First,  network  exchange theory moves beyond 
simply identifying the phenomenon and ad- 
dresses  the more  general  question  of which  po- 
sitions in which networks gain or lose from 
weak power. Our research  has answered that 
question  in theory  and  corroborated  the answer 
in experiments. 
Second, computer  simulations  revealed that 
the weak  power effect is robust  across  negotia- 
tion strategies,  and  that  some strategies  amplify 
the effect. In fact, for some networks  and strat- 
egies, the theoretical  extremes of weak power 
should be significantly  greater  than those pre- 
dicted and observed in our experiments  while 
remaining  below strong  power effects. By de- 
tecting the weak power effect at or near its 
weakest,  however,  we provided  a stringent  test 
of the extended  theory. 
Finally, the extended theory vividly illus- 
trates the mutual dependence of micro- and 
macroprocesses.  Although  we have shown that 
weak power depends on individual decisions 
and  actions,  exchange  rules,  and  network  struc- 
tures, much remains to be learned about the 
complex interactions  of these different  factors. 
Our analysis shows that accounting for deci- 
sions and behaviors  at the levels of individuals 
and  relations  can improve  our  understanding  of 
structural  effects, and that only by accounting 
for structural  contingencies can lower level 
processes  and outcomes  be  fully  compre- 
hended. 
accrue  to advantaged  positions demand  them in the 
case of structurally  advantaged actors, and grant 
them in the case of the disadvantaged.  Supplemen- 
tal analyses also revealed  that  actual  inclusion rates 
were closest to GPI3  values for inexperienced  sub- 
jects. Compared  to  {  (B)  = .60 from GPI3,  p{B  = 
.66 for inexperienced subjects and .77 for experi- 
enced subjects. For the kite network,  p (D)  = .82 
and  p (E) = .79. The probabilities  for inexperienced 
subjects  were .73 and .82, respectively, and for ex- 
perienced subjects .59 and .85. In general, GPI3 
probability  values should be empirically informa- 
tive to the degree that subjects  have no information 
beyond their  own relations,  and subjects  have more 
rounds  over which to negotiate  and adjust  offers. In 
such cases, actual  exclusions would serve as a basis 
for informing  counteroffers  and partner  choices. WEAK  POWER  209 
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